Monday, July 3, 2017

Salvacion v. Central Bank

KAREN E. SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,
G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997

FACTS:

  • Karen E. Salvacion, herein petitioner, then 12 years old, was coaxed and lured by private respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott to go with him in his apartment, where she was detained for four days from February 4 to 7, 1989; and was raped 10 times (once on February 4 and 3 times a day from February 5-7). Aside from the criminal case for serious illegal detention and 4 counts of rape filed by the Makati investigating fiscal, the petitioner along with her parents, file in Regional Trial Court (RTC) a civil case for damages with preliminary attachment against Bartelli, which the court then granted.
  • A notice of garnishment was served to China Banking Corporation, where the dollar account of the private respondent was deposited, by the Deputy Sheriff of Makati. But respondent bank invoking Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it and later on invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body. In a letter in response to the inquiry of the counsel of petitioners to Central Bank, it is stated that the provision in Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 is absolute in application and that it does not admit of any exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended.
  • March 29, 1990, after hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners, Petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit.

ISSUES:

  • Whether the dollar bank deposit of Greg Bartelli in China Bank Corporation be exempted from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body

HELD:
  • No, the provisions of Section 133 of CB Circular No. 960 are hereby held to be inapplicable to this case because of its peculiar circumstances and the Court requires respondents to comply with the writ to execution and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would justify the judgment. In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of CB Circular No 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court. Legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guessed like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended for right and justice to prevail. Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

Paras v. Comelec

PARAS v. COMELEC, (D)
G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996

FACTS:
  • Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay.
  • Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition.
  • December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.
  • January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. 
  • January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition.
  • Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter.

ISSUE:
  • Whether or not the recall election is valid.

HELD:
  • No, the recall is not valid. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
  • Petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth. The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.

Farinas v. Barba

GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS v. MAYOR ANGELO M. BARBA,
G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996

FACTS:
  • Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States.
  • To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).
  • The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government Code, disapproved the resolution “for the reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same position.
  • June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition.
  • July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.

ISSUE:
  • Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?

HELD:
  • The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.
  • The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.


Lamb v. Phipps

H. LAMB v. W.H. PHIPPS,
G.R. No. L-7806, July 12, 1912

FACTS:
  • Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on Dec. 31, 1911 due to ill health. Before that he was assigned as provincial treasurer for Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. He requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for all property and funds under his custody) in order that Lamb may be allowed to leave the Philippines without incurring criminal liability.
  • Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has settled his accounts, refuses to issue the certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a civil suit against the government. However the records also show that Fernandez signed the receipt acknowledging payment from the government.
  • The petition for mandamus, asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the certificate was demurred to by the auditor because it is a suit against the government and the petition states no cause of action.
  • The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did not do so hence the SC decided the case upon the facts Lamb intended to make.

ISSUE:
  • Whether or not mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to issue the certificate of clearance of Lamb.

HELD:
  • No, the certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded government employees and there is no averment that Lamb is a bonded employee other than having custody of government property and funds, however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a bonded officer.
  • We cannot believe that the legislature intended to limit the jurisdiction of this court in mandamus to the cases where there was no other adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary courts of law. It is our duty, therefore, to give the statute a sensible construction; such as will effectuate the legislative intention and, if possible, avoid an injustice or an absurd conclusion. Clerical errors or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute unmeaning or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended operation, will not vitiate the act; they will be corrected by the court and the statute read as amended, provided the true meaning is obvious, and the real meaning of the legislature is apparent of the face of the whole enactment.
  • It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to accept a mere paper accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of Government employees and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He may, it is true, if he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he has any doubt about the correctness of such accounts, make an actual examination of the funds and property represented by such paper accounts or balances.

Comendador v. de Villa

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, (G)
G.R. No. 93177, August 2, 1991

FACTS:
  • The petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
  • January 14, 1990, a Pre-Trial Investigation (PTI) Panel had been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 to investigate the petitioners.
  • January 30, 1990, the PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena individually addressed to the petitioners. The petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion. At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days to file their objections in writing through a Motion for Summary Dismissal.
  • February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 days to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.
  • May 15, 1990, the petitioners manifested that they were exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14 by invoking Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No.39.

ISSUE:
  • Whether or not petitioners can manifest the right to peremptory challenge.

HELD:
  • Yes, the petitioners have the right to peremptory challenge. The right to peremptory challenge was originally provided under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War).
  • November 7,1972, when President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge.
  • January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created there under, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
  • It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante rationelegis, cessat ipsa lex. Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in P.D. No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No.2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory challenge.

Matabuena v. Cervantes

CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, (D)
G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

FACTS:
  • The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
  • Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter’s stand.
  • November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965.
  • The lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed."

ISSUE:
  • Whether or not the donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property

HELD:
  • Yes, the lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.
  • It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective.

Shiou v. Chim

SY TIONG SHIOU v. SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, (G)
G.R. No. 174168, March 30, 2009

FACTS:

  • February 3 2003, Juanita Tan, corporate treasurer of Sy Siy Ho & Sons, Inc. (the corporation), a family corporation doing business under the name and style Guan Yiac Hardware, submitted a letter to the corporation’s Board of Directors (Board) statingthat Felicidad Chan Sy did not make cash deposits to any of the corporation’s banks from 1 November 2001 to 31 January 2003, thus the total bank remittances for the past years were less than reflected in the corporate financial statements, accounting books and records. Finally, Juanita Tan sought to be free from any responsibility over all corporate funds.
  • April 5, 2003, Banaria, Banaria & Company in its report, the accounting firm attributed to the Spouses Sy P67,117,230.30 as unaccounted receipts and disbursements from 1994 to 2002.
  • April 15, 2003, a demand letter was subsequently served on the Spouses Sy. On the same date, the children of the Spouses Sy allegedly stole from the corporation cash, postdated checks and other important documents. After the incident, the Spouses Sy allegedly transferred residence and ceased reporting to the corporation. Thereupon, the corporation filed a criminal complaint for robbery against the Spouses Sy before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila.
  • July 1, 2003, the corporation, through Romer S. Tan, filed its Amended Complaint for Accounting and Damages against the Spouses Sy before the RTC Manila, praying for a complete and true accounting of all the amounts paid to, received and earned by the company since 1993 and for the restitution of the said amount.The complaint also prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and or preliminary injunction to restrain Sy Chim from calling a stockholders’ meeting on the ground of lack of authority.
  • September 9, 2003, the Spouses Sy filed their Motion for Leave to File Third-Party Complaint, praying that their attached Third Party Complaint be allowed and admitted against Sy Tiong Shiou and his spouse. In the said third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy accused Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan as directly liable for the corporation’s claim for misappropriating corporate funds.
  • October 8, 2003, the trial court granted the motion for leave to file the third-party complaint, and forthwith directed the issuance of summons against Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.
  • January 16, 2004, their counsel allegedly discovered that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan were not furnished with the copies of several pleadings, as well as a court order, which resulted in their having been declared in default for failure to file their answer to the third-party complaint; thus, they instead filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
  • May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan.61The appellate court declared that a third-party complaint is not allowed under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (Interim Rules).

ISSUE:
  • Whether or not a third-party complaint is prohibited by the Interim Rules. 

HELD:
  • No, the third-party complaint should be allowed. For while a third-party complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones. Nevertheless, this conflict may be resolved by following the well-entrenched rule in statutory construction, that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. Statutes, including rules, should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief and secure the benefits intended. A statute should therefore be read with reference to its leading idea, and its general purpose and intention should be gathered from the whole act, and this predominant purpose will prevail over the literal import of particular terms or clauses, if plainly apparent, operating as a limitation upon some and as a reason for expanding the signification of others, so that the interpretation may accord with the spirit of the entire act, and so that the policy and object of the statute as a whole may be made effectual and operative to the widest possible extent. Otherwise stated, the spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in the rules in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent