Forbes v. Tiaco

W. CAMERON FORBES v. CHUOCO TIACO
G.R. No. L-6157, July 30, 1910

FACTS:

• April 1, 1910, the defendant Chuoco Tiaco filed a suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the plaintiffs alleging that on the 19th of August, 1909, under the orders of the said W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, he was deported therefrom and sent to Amoy, China, by the aforesaid J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, chiefs, as above stated, of the police and of the secret service, respectively, of the city of Manila, and that having been able to return to these Islands he feared, as it was threatened, that he should be again deported by the said defendants, concluding with a petition that a preliminary injunction should be issued against the plaintiffs in this case prohibiting them from deporting the defendant, Chuoco, and that they be sentenced to pay him P20,000 as an indemnity.
• Respondent argued that It is true that the said defendant Chuoco Tiaco, was, with 11 others or his nationality, expelled from these Islands and returned to China by the plaintiffs J. E. Harding and C. R. Trowbridge, under the orders of the plaintiff W. Cameron Forbes, but the said expulsion was carried out in the public interest of the Government and at the request of the proper representative of the Chinese Government in these Islands.
• The said complaint having been filed with the defendant A. S. Crossfield, he, granting the petition, issued against the plaintiffs the injunction requested, prohibiting them from deporting the defendant Chuoco Tiaco.
• The plaintiffs filed a demurrer against the same and presented a motion asking that the injunction be dissolved, the grounds of the demurrer being that the facts set out in the complaint did not constitute a motive of action, and that the latter was one in which the court lacked jurisdiction to issue such an injunction against the plaintiffs for the reasons set out in the complaint; notwithstanding which, the defendant A. S. Crossfield overruled the demurrer and disallowed the motion, leaving the complaint and the injunction standing.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the courts can take jurisdiction in any case relating to the exercise of this inherent power in the deportation of aliens, for the purpose of controlling this power vested in the political department of the government.

HELD:

• Under the system of government established in the Philippine Islands the Governor-General is "the chief executive authority," one of the coordinate branches of the Government, each of which, within the sphere of its governmental powers, is independent of the others. Within these limits the legislative branch cannot control the judicial nor the judicial the legislative branch, nor either the executive department. In the exercise of his political duties the Governor-General is, by the laws in force in the Philippine Islands, invested with certain important governmental and political powers and duties belonging to the executive branch of the Government, the due performance of which is entrusted to his official honesty, judgment, and discretion. So far as these governmental or political or discretionary powers and duties which adhere and belong to the Chief Executive, as such, are concerned, it is universally agreed that the courts possess no power to supervise or control him in the manner or mode of their discharge or exercise.

Gloria v. CA

RICARDO GLORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000

FACTS:

• Petitioner was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino.
• Respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST), to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag Lauro
• The President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.
• Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his reassignment, effective October 17, 1994.
• Petitioner prepared a letter to the President of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS. However, he subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.
• October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
• CA denied private respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
• CA set aside its earlier resolution denying the prayer for the issuance of a TRO; and thereafter, restrained the petitioners "from implementing the re-assignment of the petitioner from incumbent Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the MIST."
• CA issued another resolution setting the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining the petitioners from implementing the reassignment of the private respondent.
• CA issued its assailed decision; holding Memorandum of Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria to the President of the Philippines dated 10 October 1994, is hereby declared to be violative of petitioner’s right to security of tenure, and the respondents are hereby prohibited from implementing the same. 
• Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the CA has allowed itself to be instrumental in private respondent’s circumvention of the presidential immunity from suit by giving due course and granting reliefs prayed for in a suit purportedly filed against petitioners but actually questioning an act of the president.

HELD:

• No, CA did not allow itself to be instrumental in private respondent’s circumvention of the presidential immunity from suit.
• Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
• Petitioners’ submission that the petition of private respondent with the CA is improper for failing to show that petitioners constituted themselves into a "court" conducting a "proceeding" and for failing to show that any of the petitioners acted beyond their jurisdiction in the exercise of their judicial or ministerial function, is barren of merit. Private respondent has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the private respondent in a way that infringed upon his security of tenure. And petitioners themselves admitted that their questioned act constituted a ministerial duty, such that they could be subject to charges of insubordination if they did not comply with the presidential order. What is more, where an administrative department acts with grave abuse of discretion, which is equivalent to a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner, there is a justification for the courts to set aside the administrative determination thus reached.

Soliven v. Makasiar

MAXIMO SOLIVEN v. RAMON MAKASIAR (D)
G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988

FACTS:

• Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from suit.
• President Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran
• Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners 

HELD:

• Yes, the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings.
• The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
• But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
• Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

Estrada v. Desierto

JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)
G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001

FACTS:

• Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
• Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
• House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
• Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
• When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
• January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. 
• January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.
• January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. 
• January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency.
• February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." 
• February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." 

ISSUES:

• Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
• Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. 

HELD:

• Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
• In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
• Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

• An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
• Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
• What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
• In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Civil Liberties Union v. EA

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G)
G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991

FACTS:

• Petitioners maintain that this Executive Order which, in effect, allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions, albeit subject to the limitation therein imposed, runs counter to Sec 13, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides as follows:
• Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure xxx.
• Petitioner Anti-Graft League of the Philippines objects to both DOJ Opinion No. 73 and Executive Order No. 284 as they allegedly "lumped together" Sec 13, Art VII and the general provision in another article, Sec 7(2), Art IX-B. This "strained linkage" between the two provisions, each addressed to a distinct and separate group of public officers allegedly "abolished the clearly separate, higher, exclusive, and mandatory constitutional rank assigned to the prohibition against multiple jobs for the President, the Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and subalterns, who are the leaders of government expected to lead by example." Sec 7(2), Art IX-B provides:
• Sec. 7. xxx Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.

HELD:

• No, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.
• The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.
• It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
• The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself

Puyat v. de Guzman

EUGENIO PUYAT v. HON. SIXTO de GUZMAN (R)
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982

FACTS:

• An election for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held. The Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
• The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
• The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Sec 11, Art VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. 
• May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
• Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from Augusto A. Morales 10 shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.
• The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be registered on said date.
• May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
• The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
• Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig) against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero. In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior.
• The Court issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
• The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the latter in allowing intervention. The Court, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the Petition.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Sec 11, Article VIII of the Constitution. 

HELD:

• We are constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
• A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
• In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Sec 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Adaza v. Pazana

HOMOBONO ADAZA v. FERNANDO PACANA JR (D)
135 SCRA 431 March 18, 1985

FACTS:

• Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. 
• Elected vice-governor for said province was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.
• March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while respondent lost.
• July 19, 1984, petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa and since then he has discharged the functions of said office.
• July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.
• Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system.
• Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously.
• Whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.

HELD:

• No, a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] cannot exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously.
• The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office or employment in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows: Sec 10. “A member of the National Assembly [Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”
• The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine.

• Yes, a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.
• The law governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

Osmena v. Pendatun

SERGIO OSMEÑA JR. v. SALAPIDA PENDATUN (D)
GR. No.  L-17144 October 28, 1960

FACTS:

• June 23, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the 2nd District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
• The congress passed House Resolution No. 59, creation of a special committee of 15 Members to be appointed by the Speaker, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960.
• July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and 14 other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
• July 18, 1960, Petitioner is found guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for 15 months.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not House Resolution No. 59 is an infringement of Osmeña’s parliamentary immunity?

HELD:

• No, House Resolution No. 59 is an infringement of Osmeña’s parliamentary immunity.
• Sec 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
• On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly, we believe, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. 

Jimenez v. Cabangbang

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ v. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, (A)
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

FACTS:

• This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
• According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
• Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
• This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal. 

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

HELD:

• No, the publication in question is not a privileged communication.
• The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.
• Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
• The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Trillanes v. Pimentel

ANTONIO TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL SR. (D)
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

FACTS:

• July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
• On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. 
• Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.
• 4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
• Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
• The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:

• No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
• When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
• Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
• Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

People v. Jalosjos

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO JALOSJOS (D)
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000

FACTS:

• Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on 2 counts and acts of lasciviousness on 6 counts is pending appeal. 
• Accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. 

ISSUE:

• Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:

• No, membership in Congress does not exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general
• What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
• The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. 
• Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

Aquino v. COMELEC

AGAPITO AQUINO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION (D)
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

FACTS:

• Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy(CoC) for the position of Representative for the new 2nd Legislative District of Makati City providing the following information; Residence in Constituency: ___ years & 10 months.
• Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the elections
• Petitioner filed another CoC amending the certificate. Petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency for l year and 13 days. 
• Petitioner filed his Answer praying for the dismissal of the disqualification case. On the same day, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner presented in evidence, his Affidavit, lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano.
• 2nd Division of COMELEC promulgated a Resolution which DISMISS the: petition for Disqualification against respondent Agapito Aquino and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the 2nd District of Makati City.
• Elections were held. In Makati City where 3 candidates vied for the congressional seat in the 2nd District, petitioner 38,547 votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained 35,910 votes.
• Private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's 2nd Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
• COMELEC issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.
• Petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether or not the determination of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sec 17, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution.
• COMELEC issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the 2nd Division dated May 6, 1995. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the 2nd Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for the Office of Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City in the elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid.

HELD:

• Yes, COMELEC's finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of 1 year against the petitioner is valid.
• Petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. His certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac.
• The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City.
• While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati indicate that the sole purpose of transferring his physical residence is not to acquire's new residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the 2nd District of Makati City.
• Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati.

Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION (G)
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

FACTS:

• Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy(CoC) for the position of Representative of the 1st District of Leyte, providing the following information; Residence in Constituency: ___ years & 7 months. 
• Cirilo Roy Montejo filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. 
• Petitioner filed an Amended CoC, changing the entry "7 months" to "since childhood". On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor informed the petitioner that: This office cannot accept the aforementioned CoC on the ground that it is filed out of time. 
• Petitioner filed the Amended CoC with the COMELEC's Head Office in Manila. Petitioner averred that the entry of the word "7" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended CoC and that she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 
• 2nd Division of COMELEC, by a vote of 2 to 1, came up with a Resolution, 
• Finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification meritorious; 
• Striking off petitioner's Corrected CoC; and 
• Cancelling her original CoC. 
• COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. 
• COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections. On the same day, however, COMELEC reversed itself and issued a 2nd Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 
• Petitioner averred that she was the winner of the elections held May 8, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. 

ISSUE:

• Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the 1st District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections. 

HELD:

• Yes, petitioner was a resident of the 1st District of Leyte. 
• There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. 
• Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 
• An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 
• A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and 
• Acts which correspond with the purpose. 
• Even assuming that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland."