Gloria v. CA

RICARDO GLORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000

FACTS:

• Petitioner was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino.
• Respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology (MIST), to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent, Mr. Bannaoag Lauro
• The President approved the recommendation of Secretary Gloria.
• Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his reassignment, effective October 17, 1994.
• Petitioner prepared a letter to the President of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his reassignment, and furnished a copy of the same to the DECS. However, he subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the letter with the Office of President.
• October 19, 1994, the petitioner filed the instant petition.
• CA denied private respondent’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
• CA set aside its earlier resolution denying the prayer for the issuance of a TRO; and thereafter, restrained the petitioners "from implementing the re-assignment of the petitioner from incumbent Schools Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the MIST."
• CA issued another resolution setting the hearing of the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining the petitioners from implementing the reassignment of the private respondent.
• CA issued its assailed decision; holding Memorandum of Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria to the President of the Philippines dated 10 October 1994, is hereby declared to be violative of petitioner’s right to security of tenure, and the respondents are hereby prohibited from implementing the same. 
• Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the CA has allowed itself to be instrumental in private respondent’s circumvention of the presidential immunity from suit by giving due course and granting reliefs prayed for in a suit purportedly filed against petitioners but actually questioning an act of the president.

HELD:

• No, CA did not allow itself to be instrumental in private respondent’s circumvention of the presidential immunity from suit.
• Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
• Petitioners’ submission that the petition of private respondent with the CA is improper for failing to show that petitioners constituted themselves into a "court" conducting a "proceeding" and for failing to show that any of the petitioners acted beyond their jurisdiction in the exercise of their judicial or ministerial function, is barren of merit. Private respondent has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the private respondent in a way that infringed upon his security of tenure. And petitioners themselves admitted that their questioned act constituted a ministerial duty, such that they could be subject to charges of insubordination if they did not comply with the presidential order. What is more, where an administrative department acts with grave abuse of discretion, which is equivalent to a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner, there is a justification for the courts to set aside the administrative determination thus reached.

Soliven v. Makasiar

MAXIMO SOLIVEN v. RAMON MAKASIAR (D)
G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988

FACTS:

• Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because the President was immune from suit.
• President Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran
• Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners 

HELD:

• Yes, the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings.
• The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
• But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such accused.
• Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.

Osmena v. Pendatun

SERGIO OSMEÑA JR. v. SALAPIDA PENDATUN (D)
GR. No.  L-17144 October 28, 1960

FACTS:

• June 23, 1960 , the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the 2nd District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to Garcia;
• The congress passed House Resolution No. 59, creation of a special committee of 15 Members to be appointed by the Speaker, created to investigate the truth of the charges against the President made by Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June 23, 1960.
• July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and 14 other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
• July 18, 1960, Petitioner is found guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; the House approved on the same day House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for 15 months.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not House Resolution No. 59 is an infringement of Osmeña’s parliamentary immunity?

HELD:

• No, House Resolution No. 59 is an infringement of Osmeña’s parliamentary immunity.
• Sec 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any other place." Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
• On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly, we believe, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. 

Jimenez v. Cabangbang

NICANOR T. JIMENEZ v. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, (A)
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966

FACTS:

• This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
• According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
• Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.
• This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal. 

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.

HELD:

• No, the publication in question is not a privileged communication.
• The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.
• Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
• The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Trillanes v. Pimentel

ANTONIO TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL SR. (D)
G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008

FACTS:

• July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.
• On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. 
• Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the RTC of Makati.
• 4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.
• Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests".
• The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:

• No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
• When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
• Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
• Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

People v. Jalosjos

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO JALOSJOS (D)
G.R. No. 132875-76 February 3, 2000

FACTS:

• Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on 2 counts and acts of lasciviousness on 6 counts is pending appeal. 
• Accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. 

ISSUE:

• Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general

HELD:

• No, membership in Congress does not exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general
• What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
• The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. 
• Election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.