Matabuena v. Cervantes

CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, (D)
G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

FACTS:

• The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
• Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latter’s stand.
• November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiff’s complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965.
• The lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed."

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property

HELD:

• Yes, the lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half.
• It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective.