Lazatin v. HRET

CARMELO F. LAZATIN v. HRET,
G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988

FACTS:

• During the canvassing of votes, Private respondent Lorenzo Timbol objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
• Petitioner argued that the private respondent’s protest had been filed late citing Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election Code. However the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec 9 of the HRET Rules.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:

• Yes, the court ruled that the petitioner’s reliance on Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. The COMELEC’s exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
• The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
• It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusivepower to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
• The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
• Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.