Acebedo v. CA

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000

FACTS:

• Petitioner Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Petitioner basically is not allowed to practice optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit.
• Private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter, lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. Acting on such complaint, then City Mayor conduct an investigation through the City Legal Officer on the matter. Respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report to the City Mayor finding the herein petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its business permit and recommending the disqualification of petitioner from operating its business in Iligan City.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the respondent city mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing the special conditions in the permit

HELD:

• Yes, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions. In the case of Austin-Hardware, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[7] it was held that the power to license carries with it the authority to provide reasonable terms and conditions under which the licensed business shall be conducted. As the Solicitor General puts it:
• "If the City Mayor is empowered to grant or refuse to grant a license, which is a broader power, it stands to reason that he can also exercise a lesser power that is reasonably incidental to his express power, i. e. to restrict a license through the imposition of certain conditions, especially so that there is no positive prohibition to the exercise of such prerogative by the City Mayor, nor is there any particular official or body vested with such authority"
• However, Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.
• In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
• A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession, like that of optometry. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
• The regulatory power to issue licenses or permits extends only up to the regulation of a business and not in the regulation of a profession. Therefore, the acts of the mayor are ultra vires and cannot be given effect.

Cemco v. NLIC

CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC. v. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007

FACTS:

• Union Cement Corporation (UCC) has two principal stockholders UCHC with shares amounting to 60.51%, and petitioner Cemco with 17.03%. Majority of UCHCs stocks were owned by BCI with 21.31% and ACC with 29.69%. Cemco, on the other hand, owned 9% of UCHC stocks. BCI informed the Philippine Stock Exchange (PSE) that it and its subsidiary ACC had passed resolutions to sell to Cemco the BCIs stocks in UCHC equivalent to 21.31% and ACCs stocks in UCHC equivalent to 29.69%. as a result of petitioner Cemcos acquisition of BCI and ACCs shares in UCHC, petitioners total beneficial ownership, direct and indirect, in UCC has increased by 36% and amounted to at least 53% of the shares of UCC.
• As a consequence the PSE, inquired to SEC as to whether the Tender Offer Rule under Rule 19 of the Implementing Rules of the Securities Regulation Code is not applicable to the purchase by petitioner of the majority of shares of UCC.The SECs Corporate Finance Department responded to the query of the PSE that while it was the stance of the department that the tender offer rule was not applicable, the matter must still have to be confirmed by the SEC en banc. Thereafter, SEC confirmed that the SEC en banc had resolved that the Cemco transaction was not covered by the tender offer rule.
• Feeling aggrieved by the transaction, respondent National Life Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc., a minority stockholder of UCC, sent a letter to Cemco demanding the latter to comply with the rule on mandatory tender offer. Cemco, however, refused. Respondent filed a complaint with the SEC asking it to reverse its Resolution and to declare the purchase agreement of Cemco void and praying that the mandatory tender offer rule be applied to its UCC shares.
• In a Decision the SEC ruled in favor of the respondent by reversing and setting aside its Resolution and directed petitioner Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares to respondent and other holders of UCC shares similar to the class held by UCHC in accordance with Section 9(E), Rule 19 of the Securities Regulation Code.
• Petitioner filed a petition with the Court of Appeals challenging the SECs jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondents complaint and its authority to require Cemco to make a tender offer for UCC shares, and arguing that the tender offer rule does not apply. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the SEC.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not, the SEC has jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint.

HELD:

• Yes, The Court affirmed the decision of the CA. SEC was acting pursuant to Rule 19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code
• Another provision of the statute, which provides the basis of Rule 19(13) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Securities Regulation Code, is Section 5.1(n), viz:
• [T]he Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and functions: x x x (n) Exercise such other powers as may be provided by law as well as those which may be implied from, or which are necessary or incidental to the carrying out of, the express powers granted the Commission to achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws.
• The foregoing provision bestows upon the SEC the general adjudicative power which is implied from the express powers of the Commission or which is incidental to, or reasonably necessary to carry out, the performance of the administrative duties entrusted to it. As a regulatory agency, it has the incidental power to conduct hearings and render decisions fixing the rights and obligations of the parties.
• And as held by the Court of Appeals:
• We must bear in mind in interpreting the powers and functions of the SEC that the law has made the SEC primarily a regulatory body with the incidental power to conduct administrative hearings and make decisions. A regulatory body like the SEC may conduct hearings in the exercise of its regulatory powers, and if the case involves violations or conflicts in connection with the performance of its regulatory functions, it will have the duty and authority to resolve the dispute for the best interests of the public

Lazatin v. HRET

CARMELO F. LAZATIN v. HRET,
G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988

FACTS:

• During the canvassing of votes, Private respondent Lorenzo Timbol objected to the inclusion of certain election returns. But since the Municipal Board of Canvassers did not rule on his objections, he brought his case to the Commission on Elections. On May 19, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate for the first district of Pampanga. However, on May 26, 1987, the COMELEC ordered the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proceed with the canvassing of votes and to proclaim the winner. On May 27, 1987, petitioner was proclaimed as Congressman-elect. Private respondent thus filed in the COMELEC a petition to declare petitioners proclamation void ab initio. Later, private respondent also filed a petition to prohibit petitioner from assuming office. The COMELEC failed to act on the second petition so petitioner was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. On September 15, 1987, the COMELEC declared petitioner's proclamation void ab initio. Court set aside the COMELEC's revocation of petitioner's proclamation. On February 8, 1988, private respondent filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
• Petitioner argued that the private respondent’s protest had been filed late citing Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election Code. However the HRET filed that the protest had been filed on time in accordance with Sec 9 of the HRET Rules.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction over the case?

HELD:

• Yes, the court ruled that the petitioner’s reliance on Sec 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is misplaced. The COMELEC’s exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over contests relating to the election of municipal and barangay officials [Art. IX(C), Sec. 2(2)]. expressly makes the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members [Art. VI, Sec. 17].
• The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute. Its rule-making power necessarily flows from the general power granted it by the Constitution. This is the import of the ruling in the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
• It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duly enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, eighth ed., vol. 1, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusivepower to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
• The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing is that it is well within the power of the HRET to prescribe the period within which protests may be filed before it. This is founded not only on historical precedents and jurisprudence but, more importantly, on the clear language of the Constitution itself.
• Consequently, private respondent's election protest having been filed within the period prescribed by the HRET, the latter cannot be charged with lack of jurisdiction to hear the case.

Sugbuanon v. Laguesma

SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC. v. HON. UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
G.R. No. 116194, February 2, 2000

FACTS:

• Association of professional supervisory office and technical Employees Union, a labor organization affiliated with the trade Union Congress of the Philippines (APSOTEU-TUCP) file petition for certification election of supervisory employees of SRBI.
• The med-arbiter set the certification election conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP. SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the union’s petition.
• Respondent members were not managerial employees but supervisory employees which are allowed to join, form or assist their own union (art 245 labor code).
• Med-arbiter denied the motion.
• SRBI appealed to the secretary of labor and employment about the med-arbiter's decision, but then secretary denied.
• Med-arbiter scheduled the certification election, the SRBI filed a motion to suspend but then, it was denied.
• SRBI seeking the cancellation of the respondents union registration before Dole regional office; argued that APSOTEU-TUCP members are managerial and confidential employees who were prohibited from joining, organizing unions, but then dole denied.
• Then SRBI filed petition for certiorari and prohibition before the court for the annulment of the resolution of dole in favor of the order of med-arbiter w/c denied petitioner's motion to dismiss respondent union's petition for cert. election.

ISSUES:

• Whether or not the members of the union are managerial and or highly placed confidential employees.
• 2Whether or not the med-arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification of election upon the filing of a petition for certification by a registered union despite the petitioner's appeal.

HELD:

• Court denied the Petition.
• Art 212 Labor Code defines managerial and supervisory employees. Petitioner failed to show that the employees in question recommend the hiring and appointing of his subordinates well as the power to recommend any promotions and or increase salaries, and other powers such as transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline. Cashiers, accountants, and acting chief loans department of 
• Art 245 of labor code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union activities. However, in doctrine of necessary implication the disqualification of managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees.
• Petitioner does not state who among the employees has access to information specifically relating to its labor and relation policies.

DENR v. United Planners

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) v. UNITED PLANNERS CONSULTANTS , INC.,
G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015

FACTS:

• July 26, 1993 - Petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau (LMB), entered into an Agreement for Consultancy Services (Consultancy Agreement) with respondent United Planners Consultants, Inc. in connection with the LMB’s Land Resource Management Master Plan Project (LRMMP). Under the Consultancy Agreement, petitioner committed to pay a total contract price of P4,337,141.00, based on a predetermined percentage corresponding to the particular stage of work accomplished.
• December 1994 - Respondent completed the work required, which petitioner formally accepted on December 27, 1994. However, petitioner was able to pay only 47% of the total contract price in the amount of P2,038,456.30.
• October 25, 1994 - The Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical Services Office Report (TSO) finding the contract price of the Agreement to be 84.14% excessive. This notwithstanding, petitioner, in a letter dated December 10, 1998, acknowledged its liability to respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and assured payment at the soonest possible time.
• For failure to pay its obligation under the Consultancy Agreement despite repeated demands, respondent instituted a Complaint against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Due to the existence of Arbitration clause, the respondent moved for the issue to be tried through arbitration. The Arbitral Tribunal rendered its Award dated May 7, 2010 (Arbitral Award) in favor of respondent
• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Arbitral Tribunal claimed that it had already lost jurisdiction over the case after it had submitted to the RTC its Report together with a copy of the Arbitral Award
• March 30, 2011, the RTC merely noted petitioner’s aforesaid motions, finding that copies of the Arbitral Award appear to have been sent to the parties by the Arbitral Tribunal, including the OSG, contrary to petitioner’s claim. On the other hand, the RTC confirmed the Arbitral Award pursuant to Rule 11.2 (A)36 of the Special ADR Rules and ordered petitioner to pay respondent the costs of confirming the award, as prayed for, in the total amount of P50,000.00. From this order, petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration.
• June 15, 2011 - Respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, to which no comment/opposition was filed by petitioner despite the RTC’s directive therefor. In an Order dated September 12, 2011, the RTC granted respondent’s motion. Petitioner moved to quash the writ of execution, positing that respondent was not entitled to its monetary claims. It also claimed that the issuance of said writ was premature since the RTC should have first resolved its May 19, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration and June 1, 2010 Manifestation and Motion, and not merely noted them, thereby violating its right to due process.
• In an Order dated July 9, 2012, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion to quash.
• July 12, 2012 - Petitioner received the RTC’s Order dated July 9, 2012 denying its motion to quash. Dissatisfied, it filed on September 10, 2012 a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 126458, averring in the main that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in confirming and ordering the execution of the Arbitral Award.
• March 26, 2014 - The CA dismissed the certiorari petition on two (2) grounds, namely: (a) the petition essentially assailed the merits of the Arbitral Award which is prohibited under Rule 19 of the Special ADR Rules and (b) the petition was filed out of time, having been filed way beyond 15 days from notice of the RTC’s July 9, 2012 Order, in violation of Rule 19.2852 in relation to Rule 19.853 of said Rules which provide that a special civil action for certiorari must be filed before the CA within 15 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be annulled or set aside (or until July 27, 2012). Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules, resulting in the dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari.

HELD:

• The petition is DENIED, Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004,” institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System (ADR System) in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption by the Supreme Court of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means of resolving cases pending before all courts in the Philippines.
• May 7, 2010, the Arbitral Tribunal rendered the Arbitral Award in favor of respondent. Under Section 17.2, Rule 17 of the CIAC Rules, no motion for reconsideration or new trial may be sought, but any of the parties may file a motion for correction of the final award, which shall interrupt the running of the period for appeal, Moreover, the parties may appeal the final award to the CA through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

Santillon v. Miranda

PEDRO SANTILLON v. PERFECTA MIRANDA, 
G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965

FACTS:

• November 21, 1953, Pedro Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his residence, leaving one son, Claro Santillon, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
• Four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a) that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending; and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor Perfecta Miranda was appointed administrator of the estate.
• March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.
• April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate. Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
• June 28, 1961, the court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which is hereby ruled and ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the word “children” in Art. 996 can also be interpreted as “child” in accordance with Art. 892?

HELD:

• Yes, it is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the singular. So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child" is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children" will not include "child".
• Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken, contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one general rule applicable to both situations.

Santos, Jr. v. PNOC

PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. v. PNOC,
G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008

FACTS:

• December 23, 2002, PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the petitioner’s unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.
• Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondent’s employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last known address.
• Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence.
• Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
• Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioner’s answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
• Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari contending that the court committed grave abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due to improper service of summons, failure to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes and upholding technicality over equity and justice.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner with copies of orders and processes issued in the course of the proceedings

HELD:

• No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file an Omnibus Motion to Admit Attached Answer. The disputed order of September 11, 2003 was a finding that the Santos was in default for failure to file an answer or pleading within the period fixed. It is illogical to notify him of the order simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos could not reasonably demand that copies of orders and processes be furnished him. His residence or whereabouts is not known and he cannot be located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible. The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it may, a copy of the September 11, 2003 order was still mailed to him at his last known address but it was unclaimed.